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  We develop a positive non-parametric model of public sector production that 
allows us to test whether an implicit procedure of cost minimization at shadow prices 
can rationalize the outcomes of public sector activities. The basic model focuses on 
multiple C-outputs and does not imply any explicit or implicit assumption regarding 
the trade-offs between the different inputs (in terms of relative shadow prices) or 
outputs (in terms of relative valuation). The proposed methodology is applied to a 
cross-section sample of 546 Belgian municipal police forces. Drawing on detailed 
task-allocation data and controlling, among others, for the presence of state police 
forces, the cost minimization hypothesis is found to provide a good fit of the data. 
Imposing  additional  structure  on  output  valuation,  derived  from  available  ordinal 
information, yields equally convincing goodness-of-fit results. By contrast, we find 
that  aggregating  the  labor  input  over  task  specializations,  a  common  practice  in 
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Non-parametric  analysis  of  optimizing  behavior  is  rooted  in  the  works  of, 
among others, Afriat (1972) and Hanoch and Rothschild (1972). They recognized that 
optimization implies some straightforward restrictions on observed choices that can 
be  tested  without  imposing  particular  functional  forms  to  describe  preferences  or 
technology. For example, the claim that firms minimize costs implies that, at given 
input prices, the cost of any observed production activity cannot exceed the cost of 
another production activity that yields at least as much output. This observation led 
Varian  (1984) to introduce the Weak Axiom of Cost  Minimization (WACM).  He 
further developed an appropriate non-parametric technique to test for consistency with 
the axiom on the basis of sample data on firms’ input-output quantities and input 
prices. More recently, this methodology has been extended and applied to other types 
of  optimizing  behavior.  We  refer  to,  for  example,  Blundell  et  al.  (2003)  and  the 
references  therein,  for  recent  advances  within  a  utility  maximization  context. 
Moreover,  applications  of  profit  maximization  tests  in  a  production  setting  are 
discussed in, among others, Hailu and Veeman (2001). Finally, Snyder (2001) uses 
non-parametric techniques to evaluate observed data for their consistency with Pareto 
optimal provision of public goods.  
In this paper, we extend the non-parametric methodology referred to above to 
incorporate essential features of public sector behavior. The model we develop aims at 
testing  whether  the  observed  behavior  of  public  agencies  is  consistent  with  an 
appropriately  defined  optimization  problem  that  captures  a  number  of  important 
characteristics  of the environment in which such agencies typically operate. Once 
these  particular  features  are  taken  into  account,  can  the  activities  of  individual 
decision units in the public sector somehow be rationalized by optimizing behavior? 
The  proposed  methodology  is  applied  to  the  provision  of  local  public  safety  in 
Belgium, using data from a large sample of municipal police departments.  
The idea that input-output combinations in the public sector may be the result 
of optimizing behavior raises a number of issues. First, on the input side, there is 
considerable doubt that federal and local public agencies would actually pursue cost 
minimization for given input prices. A variety of reasons have been mentioned in the 
literature, including agency problems, managerial slack, regulatory restrictions, and 
the imperfect link between public sector wages and labor productivity (for discussion   2 
of these arguments, see, e.g., Bös (1986), Pestieau and Tulkens (1993), and Mueller 
(2000)). A number of empirical studies have provided some support for these ideas. 
For  example,  Atkinson  and  Halvorsen  (1986)  and  De  Borger  (1993)  produced 
evidence of deviations from cost minimizing behavior at observed input prices for 
both public and regulated firms in the US and Europe. Similarly, recent studies on the 
behavior of local governments found substantial evidence of suboptimal choices on 
the input side (see, e.g., Grosskopf et al. (1995), Hayes et al. (1998), and Grossman et 
al. (1999)). One interpretation of this literature is that, at best, the public sector may 
be guided by the implicit use of (possibly agency-specific) shadow input prices that 
reflect the phenomena mentioned above.  
  A second problem is related to the output side of public sector production 
activities. Even if such activities are guided by some underlying optimization process, 
then what are the appropriate outputs entering this process? Ever since the seminal 
paper  of  Bradford,  Malt  and  Oates  (1969),  economists  have  worried  about  the 
distinction  between  D-outputs  and  C-outputs.  The  former  are  outputs  directly 
produced (e.g., the number of tax files administered by the tax authorities, operations 
performed, the total hours patrolled by local police forces, etc.), the latter refer to 
what is the ultimate concern of citizens (e.g., public safety, health, etc.). Empirical 
studies of public sector performance have often focused on direct outputs, if only 
because D-outputs are typically easier to measure (see, among many others, Gyiamah-
Brempong (1989), Van Tulder (1994) and Grosskopf et al. (1995)). However, this 
emphasis on direct outputs is questionable. If indeed C-outputs are citizens’ ultimate 
concern, public sector officials will be held accountable for their performance relative 
to these outputs. As a consequence, C-outputs may be quite relevant in guiding public 
agencies’  decisions.  For  example,  suppose  that  citizens  evaluate  local  police 
performance in terms of changes in local safety as captured by, e.g., the reduction is 
criminal offenses of various types.  Then it seems plausible that local officials take 
such safety objectives into account when making decisions, and that they do not limit 
their  attention  to  intermediate  outputs  such  as  the  number  of  police  patrols. 
Unfortunately,  introducing  C-outputs  in  empirical  analyses  of  public  sector 
performance raises several other issues of concern. Given that prices for such outputs 
are not available, it is not clear how to model the relative valuation of the various 
outputs  by  decision  makers.  Moreover,  it  has  forcefully  been  argued  that  the   3 
production of C-outputs may strongly depend on environmental characteristics that 
are exogenous to the decision maker (see, e.g., Ruggiero (1996a,b) and MacDonald 
(2002)).   
With these considerations in mind, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, 
we develop a positive non-parametric model of (local) public sector production that 
allows us to test whether the outcomes of public sector activities can be rationalized 
by an implicit procedure of cost minimization at shadow prices (i.e., consistency with 
the WACM, but at shadow rather than market prices). Obviously, our focus is on 
necessary, not  sufficient, conditions for optimizing  behavior.  The basic model  we 
develop focuses on multiple C-outputs and does not impose any explicit or implicit 
assumption regarding the trade-offs between the different inputs (in terms of relative 
shadow prices) or outputs (in terms of relative valuation). It also takes into account 
the presence of characteristics of the production process that are exogenous to the 
decision maker. The methodology we propose to test for deviations of optimizing 
behavior builds on Varian’s (1990) suggestion to interpret standard non-parametric 
efficiency measures as goodness-of-fit indicators. He convincingly argued that such 
measures provide information on the closeness of observed outcomes with respect to 
hypothesized optimizing behavior; this insight underlies the tests developed below. 
A  second purpose of the paper is to  provide, as  far as  we know, the first 
attempt to test for deviations from shadow cost minimizing behavior by individual 
public agencies
1. We apply our methodology to a cross-section sample covering 546 
Belgian municipal police forces. The empirical analysis draws on detailed labor task-
allocation data, and it explicitly controls for the local presence of state police forces as 
an  alternative  provider  of  local  public  safety.  Several  versions  of  the  model  are 
considered. We first apply the basic model described above. We then compare the 
results with those of two variants in which more structure is added: in one case we 
aggregate labor inputs, as is common in the literature; the other variant uses a priori 
information  on  the  decision  makers’  relative  valuation  of  the  different  outputs. 
Among other findings, the results suggest that the basic model does indeed provide a 
good fit to the data. However, aggregating labor inputs, a typical characteristic of 
                                                
1 In an interesting recent paper Grosskopf et al. (1995) do test for cost minimizing behavior in the 
production  of  public safety.  However,  unlike the  current paper,  they  test  for  cost minimization at 
observed input prices, they use parametric techniques (distance functions), and they do not focus on 
direct outputs.    4 
previous police  efficiency studies, is found  to yield  a substantial reduction in the 
explanatory power of the model.  
Note from the previous discussion that there are obvious technical similarities 
between  the  methodology  suggested  to  assess  non-optimizing  behavior  and  the 
efficiency  measurement  literature.  Empirical  efficiency  studies  are  scattered 
throughout the literature and include several evaluations of the performance of local 
police  forces  (see,  e.g.,  Van  Tulder  (1994),  Thanassoulis  (1995),  and  Drake  and 
Simper  (2003)).  The  non-parametric  efficiency  literature  typically  imposes  some 
behavioral  and  technological  assumptions  (that  are  often  non-verifiable,  such  as 
convexity), and interprets deviations of observations from the estimated frontier as 
inefficiencies. Unfortunately, for public sector activities little is known about both the 
production technology (for example, can convexity be assumed?) and the trade-offs 
that  implicitly  guide  public  decision-makers,  so  that  this  interpretation  may  be 
unwarranted
2. In the current paper, we therefore take a totally different perspective. 
We do not impose non-verifiable assumptions such as convexity, and do not restrict 
the allowed trade-offs among inputs and between different outputs. We then ask the 
question whether the data are consistent with a particular behavioral model, viz. cost 
minimizing behavior at unobservable shadow prices.   
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  take  up  the 
methodological  aspects  to  adapt  the  nonparametric  methodology  to  public  sector 
behavior, incorporating shadow prices and output valuation functions. Application of 
the  methodology  to  local  public  safety  provision  by  police  departments  starts  in 
Section 3 with a discussion of our input, output, and environmental data. Section 4 
reports our empirical results on the validity of the optimizing assumptions for three 
alternative specifications of the shadow cost minimization model. Finally, section 5 




                                                
2 Imposing potentially unwarranted assumptions implies that many observations may inappropriately 
be labeled as inefficient. For example, if the true underlying technology is not convex then an analysis 
that interprets deviations from a convexified frontier as inefficiencies will obviously incorrectly label a 




















In this section we first review Varian’s (1984, 1990) WACM condition to test 
for  consistency  with  cost  minimizing  behavior,  and  his  proposal to  interpret  non-
parametric  efficiency  values  as  goodness-of-fit  indicators  with  respect  to  this 
assumption (subsection 2.1). We then extend the methodology to cover public sector 
behavior in a multiple output, shadow price framework (subsection 2.2); the basic 
model imposes no restrictions on relative shadow input prices and on the relative 
valuation of outputs. The procedure to introduce environmental variables, i.e., factors 
that are outside the control of the decision maker but do influence the production 
process, is presented in subsection 2.3. Finally, some extensions to the use of a priori 
information on the relative valuation of outputs is presented in subsection 2.4.   
 
2.1 THE WACM AND GOODNESS-OF-FIT 
Varian’s (1984) original WACM condition pertains to a setting where an input 
vector 
￿
[ + ÎÂ   is  used  for  the  production  of  a  single  output  \ + ÎÂ .  All 
technologically  feasible  input-output  combinations  are  contained  within  the 
production possibility set  ( ) { }
1 ,  can produce 
￿
7 [ \ [ \
+
+ º ÎÂ , which is equivalently 
expressed in terms of input requirement sets ( ) { } ( ) , ) .
￿
7, \ [ [ \ 7 + º ÎÂ Î  In order to 
verify whether each observed production unit provides its total output at minimal cost, 
it is necessary to value the physical inputs in cost terms. Given 7 (or 7,(\)) and an 
input price vector 
￿
S + ÎÂ , the minimal cost associated with a particular output can be 
denoted as  ( ) { } ( ; )
￿
& \ S S[ [ 7, \ º Î . 
Under complete information, consistency with cost minimizing behavior of 





+ Í Â  of observed 
input-output vectors that are subject to the production possibility set 7 The set 6 fully 
complies with the WACM if 
( ) ( ) , : ;
￿
[ \ 6 S[ & \ S " Î =             (1) 
Using  0 S[ > , the proposal is to directly measure the degree of consistency with the 
WACM at the level of each individual production unit by means of the “efficiency 
measure” :    6 





j º ;   ( ) 1 , ; 0
￿
[ \ S j ³ ³ .         (2) 
Interpretation  is  obvious:  the  measure  ( ) , ;
 
[ \ S j   reveals  to  what  extent  each 
observation  ( ) , [ \ 6 Î  contributes to consistency of 6 with the WACM. It tells us 
how close production behavior is to optimizing behavior, where closeness has a direct 
economic  meaning.  For  example,  suppose  that  ( ) , ; 1
!
[ \ S j < .  Then  the  measure 
reveals by how much actual cost should be reduced for a given output vector to be 
cost minimizing. 
Of course, the possibility set 7 is typically unknown and, hence, the WACM 
cannot be tested directly. The non-parametric approach suggests to approximate the 
theoretical set 7 by the observed set 6, and to evaluate each individual observation 
relative to this set. This yields the empirical WACM condition 
( ) ( ) , : ;
"
[ \ 6 S[ & \ S " Î = .            (3) 
Under  the  assumption  of  free  output  disposal  (any  output  reduction  remains 
producible with no change of inputs, see Färe et al. (1985) for a general definition), 
this empirical condition is checked by means of the cost efficiency measure:  
( ) ( ) { } ( ) ’
1
, ; min ’ ’, ’ ’
#
$ [ \ S S[ [ \ 6 \ \
S[
r º Î Ù ³ ,        (4) 
where the reference (minimal) cost level is computed over the input vectors x’ that are 
observed  in  combination  with  an  output  \’  that  equals  at  least  \.  By 
construction, ( ) 1 , ; 0
%
[ \ S r ³ ³ . In addition,  ( ) ( ) , ; , ;
&
’
[ \ S [ \ S r j ³  if  6 7 Í  and 
outputs  are  freely  disposable;  i.e.,  ( ) , ; 1
(
[ \ S r =   is  a  necessary  condition  for 
( ) , ; 1
)
[ \ S j = . 
The  interpretation  of  ( ) , ;
*
[ \ S r   is  analogous  to  that  of  its  notional 
counterpart  ( ) , ;
+
[ \ S j .  As  stressed  by  Varian  (1990)  and  Färe  and  Grosskopf 
(1995),  it  can  be  considered  as  an  HPSLULFDO  JRRGQHVVRIILW  measure for  the  cost 
minimization  hypothesis.  Note  that  goodness-of-fit  values  below  unity  have  been 
given (combinations of) at least two different interpretations which, unfortunately, 
cannot be separately identified in empirical work:   7 
-  ,PSHUIHFWSURJUDPPLQJ: First, using Afriat’s (1973) terminology, it can indicate 
that the production unit choosing ( ) , [ \ 7 Î  is inefficient in the sense of imperfect 
programming: even though the agency pursues cost minimization for the given 
output  value,  some  inefficiency  results.  In  a  public  sector  setting,  imperfect 
programming may be the result of having incomplete insight into the production 
possibilities  or  it  may  reflect  uncertainty  in  the  decision  making  process. 
Alternatively,  ( ) , ; 1
*
[ \ S r <  may be due to monitoring problems in principal-
agent relations. 
-  'DWD SUREOHPV:  Second,  ( ) , ; 1
,
[ \ S r <   may  reflect  data  problems  (assuming 
perfect  production  programming).  For  example,  measurement  problems  may 
cause the implicit actual cost to be overestimated and/or the reference (minimal) 
cost to be underestimated (i.e.,  6 7 Ë ), while production behavior is effectively 
cost  minimizing  for  the  given  output  value  (i.e.,  ( ) , ; 1
+
[ \ S j = ).  In  addition, 
( ) , ; 1
*
[ \ S r <   may  be  due  to  the  omission  of  relevant  input  and/or  output 
variables  in  the  empirical  analysis  (even  though  for  the  true  but  unobserved 
technology it is the case that  ( )




[ \ S j = ).
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Summarizing,  the  measure  in  (4)  gives  an  idea  about  the  extent  to  which 
observed behavior can be considered as cost minimizing behavior. It allows one to 
test the null hypothesis of consistency of production behavior with the WACM by 
means of a nonparametric gauge with a straightforward economic interpretation.  
 
 
2.2. TESTING FOR OPTIMISING BEHAVIOUR IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE BASIC MODEL 
Let us now focus on the extension of the above ideas to test for optimizing 
behavior in the public sector. As argued in the introduction, the behavior of public 
sector managers may be implicitly guided by unobservable shadow prices rather than 
(possibly observed) market prices. Moreover, we focus on direct C-output production 
which is typically multidimensional in nature. 
  First,  consider  the  fact  that  behavior  may  be  based  on  unobservable  and 
observation-specific shadow input prices. This implies that the relevant price vector S
in (4) is not observed. Given the complete absence of information on shadow input 
prices, we propose to use “most favorable” input prices to test for possible optimizing 
                                                
3  Equivalently,  ( ) , ; 1
/
[ \ S r <   can  reveal  that  different  input-output  combinations  are  subject  to 
different technological constraints; i.e., the possibility set 7 differs over observations within the set 6 
for the given input-output selection, which essentially boils down to omitted input-output dimensions.   8 
behavior in the public sector. For each observation it is checked whether there exists 
at  least  one  set  of  shadow  input  prices  that  rationalizes  observed  behavior  as  the 
outcome of a cost minimization process at these prices. If no such price vector can be 
identified, the deviation from cost minimizing behavior is evaluated using the most 
favorable set of prices, i.e., the shadow input price vector that brings the unit closest 
to cost minimizing behavior. Note that the suggested procedure is consistent with a 
search  for  necessary  conditions  for  cost  minimization;  it  leaves  observations  the 
benefit of the doubt by choosing the price vector most favorable with respect to this 
hypothesis.  
To implement the described methodology, first note that (4) is equivalently 
expressed as: 
  ( ) , ;
0
[ \ S r º 















Evaluation  on  the  basis  of  most  favorable  shadow  prices  is  then  obtained  by 
formulating the efficiency measure: 
( )
( ) ’ , ’ : 0
’












[ \ \ \
S[
s
+ Î ÎÂ >
ì ü
º ³ í ý
î þ
,           (5) 
where the selection of most favorable prices is reflected in the max operator. It is 
easily verified that  ( ) ( ) 1 , , ;
;
;
[ \ [ \ S s r ³ ³ .
4  
Second,  consider  the  problem  of  multidimensional  C-outputs  and  their 
valuation by decision makers. In other words, unlike in (5), \ is a multidimensional 
vector; i.e., 
<
\ + ÎÂ  with P> 1; moreover, the relative importance of changes in the 
various outputs to the decision maker may differ substantially. For example, those 
responsible for local police operations may be interested in reducing both property 
crime  and  accidents,  but  their  relative  valuation  of  marginal  reductions  in  these 
outputs may be quite different. In general, the decision maker’s trade-offs between the 
various  outputs  could  be  captured  by  an  RXWSXW YDOXDWLRQ IXQFWLRQ  :
=
9 + + Â ®Â , 
which associates an overall output value 9(\ with the P-dimensional vector \. The 
                                                
4  For  efficient  production  units,  the  shadow  price  vector  reveals  the  implicit  monetary  trade-off 
between inputs that makes production efficient relative to the reference production set as approximated 
by 6.  For such observations there may in fact be multiple optimal solutions (i.e. ranges of shadow 
prices), but this aspect is not important for the analysis to follow.   9 
corresponding  measure  to  test  public  sector  consistency  with  cost  minimizing 
behavior (WACM) is then defined as
5: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
’, ’ : 0
’












[ \ 9 \ 9 \
S[
s
+ Î ÎÂ >
ì ü
º ³ í ý
î þ
.         (6) 
 
Unfortunately,  of  course,  the  valuation  function  9  is  not  known,  and  to 
presuppose  a  particular  functional  form  for  9  is  obviously  inconsistent  with  the 
nonparametric  approach.  We  therefore  proceed  axiomatically  by  imposing  some 
minimal  structure  on  9
6  Although  additional  structure  could  be  imposed  (see 
subsection 2.4 below), here we only assume that 9\ is monotonically increasing in 
outputs; i.e.,  ’ \ \ ³  implies  ( ’) ( ) 9 \ 9 \ ³ . The assumption “more is never valued 
worse” seems quite plausible in the case of public services such as safety, educational 
achievements, recreational facilities, etc. Formally, letting M denote the set of such 
monotone  functions,  we  assume  9 ÎM ;  this  gives  the  following  goodness-of-fit 
measure, which is just the multidimensional counterpart of (5):  
( )
( ) ’ , ’ : 0
’












[ \ \ \
S[
q
+ Î ÎÂ >
ì ü
º ³ í ý
î þ
,           (7) 
with  ( ) ( ) , ,
H
H
[ \ [ \ q s ³  for  9 ÎM . Expression (7) then provides an appropriate 
measure to test for consistency with the WACM.  
In  the  computations  of  our  empirical  application,  we  will  use  the  linear 
programming version of (7), which can be expressed as (using  0 S[ > ) 
( ) ( ) { } , max 1;  ’ ’, ’ : ’
I
J
K [ \ X S[ X S[ [ \ 6 \ \ q
+ ÎÂ
= = £ " Î ³ ,  (8) 
where  X  denotes  the  minimal  cost  level  for  given  endogenously  selected  shadow 
prices. The normalization  1 S[ =  evidently does not affect the value of  ( ) ,
L
[ \ q . In 
practice,  one  first  identifies  the  set  ( ) ( ) { } ; ’, ’ ’
M
' \ ] [ \ 6 \ \ º Î ³   (involving  a 
straightforward vector dominance check) after which (8) can be applied. 
                                                
5 Note the subtle difference between the conditions  ’ \ \ ³  in (5) and  ( ’) ( ) 9 \ 9 \ ³  in (6). The 
former  is  a  purely  technological  condition  (viz.  free  output  disposability),  the  latter  captures  the 
implicit valuation of outputs by decision makers.  
6 In principle, an alternative would have been to make the valuation function operational by, again, sets 
of unobservable shadow (output) prices. Importantly, this is complicated by the fact that there is no 
reason why overall output value should, in general, be linear in outputs. In other words, the shadow 
prices may themselves depend on outputs.     10 
 
 
2.3. INCORPORATING EXOGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
In this subsection, we briefly turn to the issue that C-output production may 
depend  on  local  environmental  characteristics  for  which  public  decision  makers 
cannot  be  held  accountable.  More  specifically,  we  use  the  procedure  set  out  by 
Ruggiero (1996a,b) to integrate such dependencies into our model. The principle is as 
follows.  Let  ]  denote  a  vector  of  community  characteristics  which,  together  with 
direct inputs [, shape the final C-outputs. Public production can then be characterized 
by  implicit  production  possibilities  sets,  which  depend  on  the  value  of  ],  i.e. 




7 ] [ \ [
+
+ º ÎÂ    for given  } \ ] .  In  principle,  one  could  then 
immediately test the WACM for a given, identical ](i.e., holding ] constant).  
It is obvious, however, that in many applications few observations face exactly 
the same environment, which makes it problematic to implement the above procedure 
in practice. Ruggiero’s (1996a,b) proposal is therefore to focus on the case where 
’ ] ] £  can be meaningfully interpreted as ]¶ representing a relatively more favorable 
environment to produce \. In that case, it is reasonable to argue that  ) ’ ( ) ( ] 7 ] 7 Í . 
This  in  turn  implies  that  the  performance  of  an  observation  can  be  assessed  by 
reference to other observations facing an environment that is “at least as harsh”. Using 
this  assumption  then  leads  to  the  following  environment-corrected  version  of  the 
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q
+ Î ÎÂ >
ì ü
º ³ £ í ý
î þ
,        (9) 
where  we  use  the  observed  set  ( )( ) { } * ’, ’, ’ ’,  ’  for given  ’ 6 [ \ ] [ \ 6 ] = Î   as  the 
environment-adjusted version of the original set 6. Measure (9) thus computes cost 
efficiency  with  respect  to  the  conditional  reference  set 
( ) { } ’, ’ ’ produces  ’ for given  ’ [ \ 6 [ \ ] ] Î £   rather  than  the  unconditional  set  6 
(which is employed in (8)).  The linear programming version of (9) is then expressed 
as 
( ) ( ) { }
* , ; max 1; ’ ’, ’, ’ *: ’ ; ’
W
X
Y [ \ ] X S[ X S[ [ \ ] 6 \ \ ] ] q
+ ÎÂ
= = £ " Î ³ £ ,  (10) 
   11 
which has a parallel interpretation as (8).   
 
 
2.4. INCLUDING A PRIORI INFORMATION: POTENTIAL REFINEMENTS 
  The methodology presented so far imposes very minimal prior information 
regarding  the  trade-offs  between  the  different  inputs  and  outputs.  In  some 
applications,  however,  additional  information  regarding  these  trade-offs  may  be 
available, allowing one to impose more structure on the relative shadow prices or 
output valuations. On the input side, for example, some studies have restricted the 
shadow price vector 
Z
S 3 + Î Ì Â  by a priori imposing the condition that jobs with 
greater  responsibility  are  associated  with  higher  shadow  wages,  or  to  reflect  the 
condition that the same jobs should everywhere be awarded (at least approximately) 
the same salaries
7. Similarly, a priori constraints on the relative valuation between 
outputs  may  be  imposed  if  there are  good  reasons  to  do so.  It  has  recently  been 
recommended  implementing  such  information  in  nonparametric  assessments 
whenever relevant (see, e.g., Thanassoulis et al. (2004)).   
  In our application, substantial differences between police departments in the 
unobservable shadow prices can be  reasonably expected. Even observable  salaries 
differ  in  a  non-negligible  way  between  police  personnel  in  larger  cities  and  their 
colleagues  employed  in  less  densely  populated  municipalities;  moreover,  other 
shadow price variations are likely in view of differences in the composition of the 
police force, population structure, etc. The basic empirical model therefore does not 
restrict the shadow input prices at all. In one alternative specification of the model, 
however,  we  did  test  the  appropriateness  of  labor  input  aggregation  procedures 
typically used in the literature. This boils down to restricting relative shadow input 
prices for various labor categories (see section 4). 
  As  explained  in  more  detail  below,  our  data  set  does  include  ordinal 
information that can be used to impose some additional structure on the trade-offs of 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Kuosmanen and Post (2001) and Kuosmanen et al. (2004). The former study contains an in-
depth  discussion  regarding  specifications  of  the  price  set  3  that  preserve  the  linear  programming 
structure of (8). Essentially, they make explicit the shadow price interpretation of ‘weight restrictions’ 
used in the context of nonparametric efficiency evaluation (often under the label ‘Data Envelopment 
Analysis’ (DEA)).    12 
local policy makers between different outputs
8. To see how such information can be 




9 \ 9 \ ¶ ¶ > ¶ ¶  holds everywhere, with  ( )
1,...,
]
\ \ \ =  and  { } , 1,.., $ % P Î . In that 
case, one unit more of output $ may always compensate for one unit less of output %, 
but not YLFHYHUVD. To implement such an ordering in the design of our goodness of fit 
tests, we redefine the output vector \ such that the output 
^
\  is replaced by the sum 
_
‘
\ \ +  (while maintaining the original output 
_
\ ). In other words, we impose that a 
sufficient  condition  for  achieving  a  higher  output  valuation  level  consists  in 
generating at least the same value for 
a
b
\ \ +  DQG at least the same value for 
a
\ . 
Note that this suggested procedure implicitly assigns a higher marginal valuation to 
the  output  $ in  a  way  which  is  consistent  with  a  focus  on  necessary  efficiency 
conditions
9.  We  will  illustrate  the  use  of  this  type  of  ordinal  information  in  our 













































































































































In the following sections we apply the methodology to assess the consistency 
of  observable  police  activities  in  Belgium  with  cost  minimizing  behavior  at 
unobservable shadow prices, using non-parametric efficiency measures as goodness 
of fit indicators. In this section, we first briefly relate the analysis of this paper to the 
recent literature on performance measurement of police work, and then proceed to a 
discussion of the data used in the empirical analysis. 
  As argued in the introduction, a substantial literature exists on evaluating the 
efficiency  of  police  departments  (see,  among  many  others,  Thanassoulis  (1995), 
                                                
8 Specifically, it turns out that policy makers value reductions in violent crime consistently different 
from reductions in non-violent crime. See Section 4 below. 
9 Consider by way of illustration the following numerical example. Suppose we want to evaluate a 
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\ \  = ( ) 4,6 . The procedure we described above 
implies that 5 yields a higher output valuation than ( under our assumptions. On the contrary, 5 
does not because it produces less of output A. Output A is implicitly valued more highly than B. Of 
course, note that several extensions of this ordinal output weighting procedure are conceivable. For 
example, an analogous procedure may be followed for introducing a multi-layer ordinal structure (e.g., 
$ is valued more than %and % is more important than &).   13 
Drake  and  Simper  (2003),  Van  Tulder  (2000)).  These  studies  typically  calculate 
inefficiency scores assuming a particular behavioral model (e.g., cost minimization, 
output  maximization,  etc.).  Moreover,  the  aggregation  of  labor  inputs  typically 
employed implies strong restrictions regarding the relative prices of different types of 
labor.  Finally,  in  the  few  cases  where  multiple  C-outputs  have  been  used,  quite 
stringent assumptions have been imposed on the relative valuation of these outputs
10. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, despite some useful insights that have been obtained from 
these studies, this efficiency approach to evaluate police performance has been subject 
to  some  critique  (see,  in  particular,  Stone’s  (2002)  comments  on  Spottiswoode’s 
(2000) report on police force efficiency in the UK). One argument is that efficiency 
measurement boils down to a normative application of optimizing models, for which 
the underlying assumptions (e.g., assuming cost minimizing behavior) may not be 
appropriate.  Furthermore,  the  input  aggregation  as  commonly  applied  may  be 
misleading, and the restrictions imposed on relative output valuations are difficult to 
justify.  
In  this  paper,  we  therefore  take  a  positive  view  towards  non-parametric 
analysis of police production. Rather than imposing a particular behavioral model, we 
test the consistency of observed police activities with an appropriately defined cost 
minimization model.  Specifically,  our basic model tests the goodness-of-fit  of the 
assumption  of  cost  minimization  at  unobservable  shadow  input  prices,  given  a 
monotone output valuation function. Unlike the efficiency literature, we impose only 
very weak restrictions on the trade-offs between inputs (relative shadow prices) and 
between marginal output valuations.  
Our police data are mostly taken from a rich collection of statistics gathered by 
the Belgian Interior Ministry for the year 2000. Our cross-section sample consists of 
546 observations. Since there are 589 Belgian municipalities, less then 8% had to be 
excluded from the original sample due to lack of data. Note that the data refer to the 
period just prior to a huge consolidation operation (2002-2003) in which the Belgian 
                                                
10    For  example,  Van  Tulder  (1994)  has  used  imputed  output  prices  on  the  basis  of  the  average 
sentences imposed by judicial authorities for certain crime types. Other studies based output prices on 
the  value  of  stolen  goods  (Darrough  and  Heineke,  1979).  Recently,  several  authors  advocate  a 
subjective method where police output “prices” are derived from public or expert opinion (see, e.g., 
Carr-Hill (2000) and Stone (2002)). We are, however, not aware of published empirical applications 
that effectively use this ‘subjective’ approach.       14 
police structure was profoundly reshaped: police operations were reorganised into 195 
local police zones that replaced the previous ‘municipal’ organisation
11.  
We use four variables to describe the C-outputs. Treating crime indicators and 
accidents as ‘bads’, the inverse of the following variables is used:  
(i)  local traffic accidents
12,  
(ii)  non-violent property crimes and extortion, 
(iii)  violent crimes, and 
(iv)  all other reported crimes.  
  Note that this choice of outputs is neither very novel nor uncontested. Three 
types of critique on using this kind of output measures have been reported in the 
literature. First, it has been argued that the type of output indicators we use should 
preferably  be  regarded  as  exogenous  outputs  in  police  production  (see,  e.g.,  Van 
Tulder (1994, 2000)), or even as inputs (see Thanassoulis (1995)). Second, it has been 
claimed that these indicators do not capture all offences that are effectively committed 
(i.e.,  the  so-called  dark-number  problem,  as  recently  discussed  by  MacDonald 
(2002)). Third, and most importantly, several authors have pointed at the possibility 
that the recorded crime-rate goes up following an increase in police inputs, creating a 
perverse  link between resources and the outputs  used to assess public safety. For 
example, Cameron (1988) extensively documents the empirical lack of support for a 
negative relationship between the size of police forces and crime rates. Similarly, 
Schwab and Zampelli (1987) mention this perverse relationship as one of the prime 
reasons for not using such output measures when estimating the characteristics of the 
production technology or income and price effects of the demand for public safety. 
More  recent  research,  carefully  controlling  for  the  problem  of  endogenous  police 
inputs (i.e., the latter may be high just because there is a high crime rate) did find 
evidence for a negative relation between police inputs and the crime rate; see, e.g., 
Levitt (1997). It is clear, however, that the issue remains unsettled.  
  Although the above arguments have quite some merit, the key motivation for 
using the above listed outputs for our empirical tests is threefold. First, as argued in 
                                                
11 To the extent that they are available, more recent data may be less suited for the purposes of the 
current paper in  view  of possible transition effects associated with the move to a completely  new 
institutional environment.  
12 ‘Local traffic accidents’ refers to accidents with personal injuries on local (non-highway) roads.     15 
the  introduction, C-outputs  rather than direct outputs do form the major basis  for 
public  accountability  with  respect  to  public  safety.  Indeed,  crime  and  accident 
statistics are among the most important indicators underlying intensive public debate, 
as  witnessed  by  the  media  attention  and  political  debate  which  surrounds  their 
publication.  Second, in view of the positive and explanatory nature of our tests, it 
seems hardly sustainable that police officials aiming at crime-reduction in effect base 
allocative decisions on XQUHSRUWHG incidents.
13 In a similar vein, it seems ill-advised to 
make  use  of  FOHDUHG  crimes.  In  Belgium  as  well  as  in  most  other  countries,  this 
particular measure heavily relies on the behavior of actors further down the judicial 
chain, and it is therefore not well-suited to evaluate local police work as such. Third, 
by focusing on possible deviations from cost minimizing behavior, the emphasis in 
this paper is clearly on allocative decisions of local police managers on the input side, 
conditional on output levels. To the extent that policy makers do base their input 
allocation  decisions  on  unreported  crimes,  one  expects  this  to  result  in  a  poor 
goodness-of-fit relative to the shadow cost minimization hypothesis.  
Turning to the input side, an interesting feature of our data set is that it allows 
us to distinguish between different labor allocation categories. For each local police 
department, the Belgian Interior Ministry collected  detailed statistics  on personnel 
allocation over different tasks.  We were thus able to distinguish labor allocated to:  
(i) community policing,  
(ii) intervention squads, 
(iii) victim aid, 
(iv) criminal investigation, and  
(v)  administrative/managerial services.  
  In each of these tasks, we only retained policemen or civilians that were assigned to 
this  specific  task  on  at  least  a  0.8  full-time  basis.  The  remainder  of  (“non-
specialized”) labor inputs was grouped into:  
(vi)  a residual labor allocation category.  
                                                
13 As Carr-Hill (2000) observes, even countries that emphasize zero tolerance still base their policy on 
reported  incidents.    He  correspondingly  argues  that  survey  information  is  more  appropriate  than 
reported  crime  figures  only  if  public  confidence  in  the  police,  rather  than  crime  reduction,  is  the 
relevant objective of the analysis. .    16 
Finally, these labor data were complemented with information on:  
(vii) the total hours per week that the local police unit could be contacted.  
 
Although deviating from most earlier empirical studies on police activities, 
disaggregating the labor input along these functional lines is extremely valuable to 
grasp realistic allocative decisions of police managers. What they have to decide upon 
is not so much the optimal use of capital versus labor, but rather how to allocate 
personnel  over  the  different  functional  categories  so  as  to  contribute  as  much  as 
possible to the safety objectives they have in mind. This yields a somewhat richer 
approach  than  typically  in  the  empirical  literature.  If  not  lumped  together, 
“uniformed”  and  “civilian”  personnel  are  the  standard  two  labor  categories  often 
considered  (e.g.,  Grosskopf  et  al.  (1995),  Van  Tulder  (2000),  Drake  and  Simper 
(2002)).  In contrast, note that we do not consider capital inputs in the analysis below, 
as there is an outspoken proportional relationship in local police units between labor 
and capital equipment indicators in our sample.
14  
Finally,  we  included  several  variables  that  are  important  in  shaping  the 
production possibilities of local police services but that are outside the control of local 
decision makers; these are the z-variables discussed in section 2.3. First, an interesting 
and novel feature of our data set is that information is included on the inputs provided 
by  the  state  police  organism  (the  so-called  5LMNVZDFKW/*HQGDUPHULH)  as  a 
complimentary public provider of local safety
15. To the best of our knowledge, the 
fact that in most countries several police forces co-exist and influence public safety 
simultaneously  has  not yet been accounted for in an  empirical analysis.  To some 
extent  this  can  be  attributed  to  an  evident  non-overlapping  jurisdiction  problem, 
which implies that state or federal police resource data are typically not itemized on 
the municipal level.  But in our particular sample –a cross-section snapshot on the eve 
of  a  merger  of  Belgian  municipal  police  forces  with  decentralized  state  police 
                                                
14 For example, the sample correlation of total police personnel with the total number of vehicles in a 
local police force, an often used capital measure, amounts to 0.96.  For another commonly used capital 
measure, available PC’s, these figures are very similar. It is a well-known feature of the nonparametric 
goodness-of-fit measures used in this paper that their value is hardly affected when introducing an 
additional input that correlates almost perfectly with another input that was already taken up in the 
evaluation model. 
15 These have been integrated with local police forces in the recent reorganization. In 2000, however, 
they  co-existed  with  local  police;  although  their  activities  extended  beyond  providing  local  safety 
services, they did provide important inputs.   17 
brigades– we do have the appropriate data. Specifically, we use for each municipality 
the state police personnel figures that the Belgian Ministry of Interior calculated for 
the year 2000. Our use of the input by state police forces as an exogenous input in the 
analysis implies that any municipal force is only compared, ceteris paribus, with other 
observations that face an input environment which is “at least as harsh”, i.e., with 
observations that have at most the same level of state police personnel. Importantly, 
consistent  with  the  idea  that  these  inputs  are  exogenous,  the  figures  are  not 
additionally used to calculate the goodness-of fit value of an observation.   
  Second, several other variables have been considered for possible inclusion as 
exogenous z-variables. In view of the procedure to incorporate exogenous factors, as 
explained in section 2.3, note the importance of a monotone relation of potential z-
variables  with  cost  efficiency.  Recently,  Daraio  and  Simar  (2003)  developed  a 
probabilistic  approach  to  test  for  the  presence  of  such  monotone  relationships. 
Application of this methodology provided a strong corroboration of the hypothesis of 
a  monotone  relation  between  population  size  and  cost  efficiency
16.  However,  the 
Daraio-Simar  procedure  did  not  additionally  reveal  similarly  obvious  patterns  for 
other frequently considered environmental factors such as median income, population 
density  or  municipality  area  size.  Therefore,  only  population  was  included  in  the 
empirical analysis
17.  
In Table 1 we provide an overview of the variables selected for the analysis, 
together with some summary statistics describing sample characteristics. To facilitate 
the interpretation, we report the original crime and accident figures; as argued before, 
we use their inverse as output measures in the analysis. Moreover, as the distributions 
of the input and output data are quite skewed for almost all variables, we also report 
averages for a number of subgroups in our sample such as the large cities, regional 
cities  and  small  rural  municipalities.  Clearly,  the  major  cities  are  outliers  in  the 
sample. Further observe the low average values for some of the labor input categories, 
such  as  victim  aid  and  criminal  investigation.  It  is  not  unusual  for  smaller 
                                                
16 For the sake of brevity, we do not include these results in this paper, but they are available from the 
authors upon request. 
17 One could argue whether this particular dimension is an exogenous output –it has been used as a 
proxy for heterogeneous police outputs in older studies by Hirsch (1959) or Popp and Seebold (1972)–, 
or rather an environmental variable that captures the relative ease by which a higher (absolute) safety 
level can be achieved in a municipality.  While we do prefer the second interpretation, we note that 
both are similarly reconcilable with Ruggiero’s (1996a,b) methodological framework.    18 
municipalities not to assign close to full time personnel to these categories; moreover, 
at the time the data were collected by the Ministry of the Interior, aid to victims was a 
relatively new full-time and distinct activity. Finally, note that the relation between 
the  presence  of  state  police  and  the  size  of  municipalities  is  not  monotonically 
declining: state police input per 1000 inhabitants is higher in both the large cities and 
small rural municipalities as compared to regional cities. One plausible explanation 
for this phenomenon is that state police was used to guarantee a minimum acceptable 
scale in rural (large surface area) municipalities.      
































$FFLGHQWDQG&ULPHUDWHV            
    Traffic accidents  0.078  0.665  0.083  0.736  0.441  0.025 
    Non-violent property  0.761  0.305  0.567  23.356  3.734  0.125 
    Violent  0.272  0.460  0.264  5.422  1.407  0.073 
    All other crimes  0.472  0.446  0.462  9.793  2.177  0.134 
             
&RQWUROODEOHLQSXWV            
/DERU,QSXWVSHUFDWHJRU\            
   Community policing  0.142  0.538  0.212  1.514  0.338  0.088 
   Intervention squads  0.231  0.590  0.430  1.060  0.919  0.021 
   Victim aid  0.008  0.303  0  0.028  0.018  0.008 
   Criminal investigation  0.038  0.288  0  0.313  0.124  0.003 
   Administrative/Staff  0.134  1.070  0.184  0.530  0.186  0.106 
   Non-specialized  0.821  1.604  1.018  2.777  1.219  0.722 
2WKHU            
   Contact hours (*)  52  0.63  50  718  115  35 
             
([RJHQRXVLQSXWV            
    State police personnel  0.823  1.948  0.981  1.022  0.766  1.102 
2WKHU            
    Population (**)  18 126  0.642  19 400  237 886  71 152  6 226 
Note: all average and 75-th percentile figures per 1000 inhabitants, except (*: hours per week) and (**).  See 
footnote 11 for the definition of traffic accident data. The population data are those reported by the National 
























































In  this  section  we  present  empirical  results  based  on  the  methodology 
discussed in section 2. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the goodness of fit 
results  for  three  alternative  specifications  of  the  model.  We  also  compare  the 
statistical significance of the differences in goodness of fit measures obtained for the 
various model specifications. Indeed, Varian (1990) has convincingly argued that the 
full distribution of the efficiency values should be studied in practical applications, 
claiming that “the pattern of violations [of the efficiency conditions] may tell us a lot 
about what is going on in the data” (p. 131).  The three alternative specifications of the 
model differ from one another in terms of the restrictions imposed on the shadow 
input prices and the relative valuations of the outputs:  
 
(a) The basic model (denoted &RVW(IILFLHQF\&() determines the cost efficiency 
measures calculated on the basis of all inputs and outputs discussed in section 3; it 
also  includes  the  presence  of  state  police  forces  and  population  as  exogenous 
variables, following the Ruggiero (1996a,b) procedure discussed in section 2.3.  
 
(b) A second version of the model imposes restrictions on the relative shadow input 
prices. As mentioned in section 3, it is common practice in the existing literature to 
use  an  aggregate  labor  input  for  analyzing  the  productive  efficiency  of  police 
departments. In terms of our model, such a procedure implies the assumption that the 
shadow  price  of  personnel  is independent  of its  task  specialization.  To  check  the 
sensitivity of the goodness-of-fit results with respect to this additional assumption, we 
consider a model (denoted ,QSXWV:HLJKWHG(,:)) that considers only two inputs: the 
first one is the aggregate of the original labor inputs (i)-(vi), the second one is the 
original input (vii); the latter cannot be taken up in the aggregation procedure as it is 
expressed in a different measurement unit (i.e., opening hours instead of full-time 
equivalents). 
 
(c)  A  third  model  specification  introduces  some  available  (ordinal)  a  priori 
information  regarding  the  relative  marginal  valuation  of  outputs  by  local  policy   21 
makers. This model is denoted 2:2XWSXWV:HLJKWHG); it follows the methodology 
explained in section 2.4. The a priori information on output valuation is taken from a 
nationwide  survey  conducted  in  2000  by  the  Belgian  Ministry  of  the  Interior.  A 
consistent finding in this survey is that citizens rank traffic accidents and burglary 
(rather common offenses, so that the probability of citizens to become a victim sooner 
or later is high) substantially higher on their priority list than violent crime (which is, 
fortunately, still rather uncommon). Of course, this does not imply that people are less 
upset by violent crime, when it occurs, than by traffic accidents. It only means that 
their overall day to day safety feeling is less affected by types of offenses with which 
they are not, or very infrequently, confronted
18.  To see to what extent the use of this a 
priori information, which is available to local policy makers so that they can respond 
to it, affects the goodness of fit results, we impose the constraint on the model that 
“traffic accidents” and “property crimes” (outputs (i) and (ii)) are more problematic 
than “violent crimes” (output (iii)). The procedure to incorporate this type of ordinal 
information was explained in section 2.4. 
 
We now turn to the empirical results. Table 2 provides summary statistics for 
the  three  distributions  (&(,  2:  and  ,:)  obtained  for  the  alternative  model 
specifications. The table first gives information on the goodness-of-fit (efficiency) 
values calculated for the various models, and it reports summary information on the 
number of comparison partners. This refers to the number of police departments that 
dominate an evaluated department, in the sense of generating more outputs with fewer 
inputs in an environment that is at least equally harsh (see the discussion of (8) and 
(10) in section 2). Next, the lower part of Table 2 gives for each of the three models 




                                                
18 The survey (‘Veiligheidsmonitor’) asked people to rank various types of crime and offenses on a 
scale from ‘considered not very problematic at all’ to ‘considered very problematic’. Although there 
were of course differences in citizens’ ranking of different safety threats over various regions and types 
of municipalities, the lesser importance of violent crimes relative to traffic offences and burglary was a 
consistent finding. Despite this observation, the 2:-model should be considered as illustrative at best, 
if only because the crime categories used in the safety survey (traffic offenses, burglary, etc.), although 
obviously closely related in spirit, are not exactly the same as the ones we discern in our empirical 
















$YHUDJH 95.90%  10.60  94.87%  7.14  77.07%  10.60 
VWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQ 11.17%  24.79  12.05%  18.30  31.14%  24.79 
PD[LPXP 100.00%  223  100.00%  197  100.00%  223 
0LQLPXP 30.41%  0  30.41%  0  7.14%  0 
7KUHVKROGHIILFLHQF\YDOXHV«SHUFHQWDJH QXPEHU SHUFHQWDJH 1XPEHU SHUFHQWDJH QXPEHU
55%  97.99%  535  97.62%  533  94.51%  516 
60%  97.07%  530  96.70%  528  92.31%  504 
65%  95.79%  523  95.24%  520  89.19%  487 
70%  94.87%  518  93.41%  510  86.45%  472 
75%  94.14%  514  92.49%  505  82.23%  449 
80%  92.12%  503  89.93%  491  78.39%  428 
85%  88.46%  483  85.53%  467  73.99%  404 
90%  86.45%  472  82.23%  449  69.60%  380 
95%  84.07%  459  79.67%  435  65.38%  357 
100%  81.68%  446  76.37%  417  63.55%  347 
1RWH: “percentage” stands for the percentage of observations that have an efficiency value that equals 
at least the value in the left column and “number” stands for the corresponding absolute number of 
observations.

A first observation is that the basic &( model generally provides a good fit of 
the  data.  On  average,  the  results  imply  small  deviations  from  cost  minimizing 
behavior; average scores amounts to almost 96%, and the standard deviation is fairly 
small. Moreover, for more than 80% of all observations a set of shadow input prices 
existed that induced consistency with cost minimizing behavior: indeed, some 81.68% 
of the observations attain a calculated efficiency value of 100%. Reassuringly, it is 
found that the efficiency scores have been computed with reference to on average 
some 11 (viz. 10.6) comparison partners. This allows us to be reasonably confident in 
the favorable goodness-of-fit results, as they can hardly be attributed to the systematic 
presence of a small number of comparison partners; the latter would signal low power 
of  the  WACM  tests.  A  first  conclusion  is,  therefore,  that  cost  minimization  at 
unobservable shadow prices is a behavioral model that has good explanatory power 
for the observed task allocation within Belgian police departments. 
Second,  however,  a  fair  number  of  local  police  services  shows  quite 
substantial deviations from cost minimizing behavior: for example, we find that the 
minimum efficiency value amounts to no more than some 30%. Table 2 also reveals 
that 16 out of the 546 observations have an efficiency value below 60 %. Since we 
focus  on  the  overall  validity  of  the  public  sector  variant  of  the  WACM  model,   23 
disentangling the relative importance of alternative interpretations (pure inefficiency 
versus data measurement problems; see section 2.1) and actually explaining these low 
scores for individual observations is not pursued in the current study. Still, given the 
very  weak  conditions  imposed  on  the  model,  for  example  the  use  of  observation 
specific  and  most  favorable  shadow  input  prices,  the  large  deviations  from  cost 
minimizing behavior for some police departments are a remarkable finding.   
In a next step we compare the results for the &( model with those for the 
alternative  2:  and  ,:  models.  In  general,  Table  2  indicates  that  both  these 
alternative model formulations yield lower goodness-of-fit values than the basic &( 
model. In  a sense, of course, this is not that surprising, because the 2: and  ,: 
models impose  additional  structure  on  the  behavioral  model.  Moreover,  it  is  well 
known  that  efficiency  measurement  is  not  totally  insensitive  to  the  number  of 
dimensions, and the ,: model does reduce the number of dimensions by aggregating 
inputs.  
Still, the differences between the models are relevant from the goodness-of-fit 
perspective we take in this paper. Importantly, the results for the ,: model suggest 
that aggregating labor inputs does strongly affect the goodness-of-fit with respect to 
the cost minimization hypothesis. For example, average efficiency amounts to only 
77%, and the ,: model finds only some 63% of all observations in line with the 
WACM hypothesis. The model does not generally provide a good fit to the data. We 
previously argued that, from a managerial perspective, there are good reasons for a 
functional decomposition of the labor inputs, because this is more in line with realistic 
allocation decisions by local police departments than the aggregate inputs typically 
employed in empirical studies. The differences in results between the basic &( model, 
based on functional disaggregation, and the ,: model, reflecting aggregation of labor, 
suggest that the latter performs much worse as an explanatory model of the behavior 
of police departments. 
In contrast, the figures reported for the 2: model indicate that the inclusion 
of  the  additional  assumption  that  police  officers  are  responsive  to  the  (ordinal) 
information  regarding  output  valuation  of  citizens  turns  out  to  be  quite  harmless. 
Average test scores for the 2:model are only marginally affected, amounting to 
almost 95%; the same holds for the number of observations deviating substantially   24 
from cost minimization. Moreover, the 2: model still identifies some 76% of the 
sample as 100% in accordance with the associated WACM conditions. 
  To conclude, we evaluate the statistical significance of the differences in the 
efficiency values caused by the alternative model specifications. To do so, we use 
non-parametric (Kernel-based) tests. We abstract from an in-depth discussion of the 
test procedure, but refer to Kumar and Russell (2002) for an application in a similar 
context as the one of this paper
19. To account for possible sensitivity of our test results 
with respect to the Kernel bandwidth specification, we have carried out the tests for 
three alternative bandwidth selections, viz.. 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.  
  The formal test results, which are tabulated in Table 3, confirm our earlier 
impression: while the &( distribution does not systematically differ from the 2: 
distribution for any reasonable significance level (and for all bandwidth selections), 
there is a significant difference with the ,: distribution. In other words, we may 
indeed  expect  the  usual  input  aggregation  practice  (underlying  the  ,:  model)  to 
distort  the  efficiency analysis, so possibly  leading to ill-justified conclusions. Our 
results suggest that aggregation of functional labor categories is potentially distorting. 
As a consequence, we plead for a labor input disaggregation, which results in a much 
better overall fit of the data. In addition, putting additional structure on the output 
valuation  function,  which  is  based  on  the  limited  external  information  that  is 
available, enhances the statistical power of the nonparametric WACM tests and does 
an equally convincing job as the basic &( model in terms of goodness-of-fit
20. 
                                                
19 See also Pagan and Ullah (1999, p. 68-69) for a formal introduction to the test procedure. Given our 
specific setting, we effectively exploit Li’s (1996) argument that these Kernel-based tests remain valid 
for  comparing  the  distributions  of  dependent  variables.  The  latter  is  indeed  the  case  here,  as  the 
different goodness-of-fit measures are computed with respect to the same sample of observations. 
20 An alternative strategy may consist of imposing additional structure on the production possibilities. 
For  example,  many  efficiency  studies  of  police  departments  employ  production  technology 
assumptions  such  as  convexity  or  constant  returns-to-scale  (see  e.g.  Färe  et  al.  (1994)  for  a 
methodological introduction into the nonparametric modeling of such assumptions). We performed 
similar  tests  as  those  reported  in  Table  3  under  such  assumptions.  It  was  found  that  there  was  a 
significant deterioration of the goodness-of-fit results when imposing convexity or constant returns-to-
scale. As argued in the introduction, given that such technology properties are usually non-verifiable, 




QRUPDOL]HGVWDWLVWLFV &( 0.000  0.674  10.553* 
EDQGZLGWK 2: 0.674  0.000  5.781* 
 ,: 10.553*  5.781*  0.000 
QRUPDOL]HGVWDWLVWLFV &( 0.000  0.703  11.649* 
EDQGZLGWK 2: 0.703  0.000  6.625* 
 ,: 11.649*  6.625*  0.000 
QRUPDOL]HGVWDWLVWLFV &( 0.000  0.589  10.571* 
EDQGZLGWK 2: 0.589  0.000  6.219* 
 ,: 10.571*  6.219*  0.000 
1RWH: “normalized  statistics” stands for the values of the test statistic that should follow a standard 
normal distribution under the null hypothesis of equal efficiency distributions (see Pagan and Ullah 
(1999, p. 68-69) for its construction); “*” indicates a significant difference between the efficiency 





















We have developed a positive nonparametric model of (local) public sector 
production that allows us to test whether the outcomes of public sector activities can 
be  rationalized  by  optimizing  behavior.  Our  extensions  essentially  accommodate 
existing tools to a number of characteristic features of managerial decision making in 
the public sector. First, we take into account that public sector decision makers may 
well optimize behavior with respect to unobservable shadow input prices rather than 
(possibly  observed)  market  prices.  Second,  an  output  valuation  function  was 
introduced which accounts for the typically multidimensional nature of local public 
sector output, without imposing constraints on the relative marginal valuation of the 
different outputs by local decision makers. Moreover, the evaluation model focuses on 
C-output production, i.e., on outputs that are the ultimate concern to citizens. Based 
on these concepts, a goodness-of-fit measure was introduced that can be used to test 
for  the  consistency  of  observed  behavior  with  cost  minimization  at  unobservable 
shadow input prices. This can be interpreted as a public sector version of the WACM 
condition introduced by Varian (1984). 
Our application to a cross-section sample of Belgian municipal police forces 
deviates from the existing literature by drawing on detailed task-allocation data and 
by controlling for the presence of state police forces. We test for consistency with 
respect to the cost minimization hypothesis for three different model specifications. 
The first model does not impose any additional structure on the trade-offs between   26 
inputs  (on  the  input  shadow  prices)  or  outputs  (on  the  relative  marginal  output 
valuations). We found that it provides a good description of the data: the input-output 
combinations  observed  for  many  local  police  departments  are  consistent  with  the 
appropriately defined cost minimization problem, and average deviations from cost 
minimizing behavior are small.  
Next,  we  carried  out  a  more  refined  WACM-test  that  incorporates  more 
structure  on  the  output  valuation  function;  this  additional  structure  was  based  on 
ordinal  information  provided  by  a  survey  of  the  Belgian  Interior  Ministry.  The 
resulting evaluation model, which implies a more powerful analysis, obtains equally 
convincing  goodness-of-fit  results  for  the  WACM.  By  contrast,  we  find  that 
aggregating the personnel input for the different specialization tasks, which basically 
boils down to adding structure on the input trade-offs, entails a significantly worse fit 
of the data. This suggests that such an aggregation, which is common practice in 
efficiency studies of police departments, may DSULRUL distort the analysis and, hence, 
lead to ill-justified conclusions.   27 
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